

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

March 1, 1971

Henry:

State had not invited the King of Thailand to the U. S. as the President had suggested but had instead sent a memo to us outlining their plans to do so.

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE  
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

In the interim the President saw Ambassador Kennedy prior to his trip to the Far East. He suggested that the Ambassador enlarge his itinerary to include Bangkok. In doing so, he asked the Ambassador to be sure that the Thais knew that the King was being invited to visit the United States.

As a result of this action, I notified State as did Kennedy and he departed with the intent of inviting the King. In the interim State is flashing Unger so that he is aware that an invitation is to be extended.

Jeanne Davis is preparing a memo for the President informing him that the King is being invited, getting a time from Chapin, and setting format for formal press.

Al Haig

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DOS Review Completed.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
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25639

INFORMATION

February 26, 1971

SECRET

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN... *HK* ✓

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER *HK*  
SUBJECT: Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Criticizes U. S.

You may be interested in Ambassador Unger's report of three conversations between Foreign Minister Thanat and the British Ambassador. The main points follow:

- Thanat criticized the Americans for continuing to engage in the sterile Paris discussions, sticking on the two points of mutual withdrawal of forces and continuity of the Thieu-Ky Government. Thanat characterized these as not really important points, mentioning that if Big Minh, for whom he has no great respect, could nonetheless negotiate successfully with the Communists, then this would be better than Thieu-Ky.
- Thanat observed that the American military was sound and would like to do the right thing but Congress would not permit this and in any case America as a whole had lost its stomach for playing any kind of role in Southeast Asia and only wanted to get out. Thanat paid homage to the great efforts the U. S. had made previously, and granted that the U. S. should be helped to find a way to withdraw without humiliation. Thanat appeared to regard U. S. withdrawal as virtually total and inevitable.
- In a discussion of what might be the basis for a settlement in Southeast Asia, Thanat made clear that he realized this might not be achievable without South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia coming under Communist domination but that was something he was prepared to accept. Thailand will not go Communist and will be able to hold its own. There was some suggestion of a continuing role in the region by the U. S. to help Thailand. Some kind of accommodation with Communist China would also be a part of the pattern.

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SECRET

2

- Unger notes indications earlier in January of Thanat's sour state of mind and concludes that Thanat's remarks indicate he has moved about 180 degrees on such matters as his lack of concern about what the Communists might be able to accomplish in Indochina and his indifference to the fate of the present Saigon Government.
- Ambassador Unger concludes that Thanat was probably speaking for himself, not the Thai Government, that Unger should take opportunities to refute Thanat's views in the same indirect way he received them (through other Ambassadors) and that we should not over-react to these and other signs of Thai nervousness as they go about modifying and de-intensifying their relations with us in the days ahead.

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Comment

*OK*  
*K what about the*  
*State visit - ? - we*  
*should move on it now*

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